The arguments produced by the brand new amici in support of appellee question which next matter
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<¶>The second question we must decide is whether the STLA prohibits MLA registrants from making payday-style loans even if those loans are otherwise permissible under the MLA. This issue arises because, despite its determination that the MLA does not apply to single-installment loans, the court of appeals’ majority went on to hold that the General Assembly intended, by its repeal of the Check–Cashing Lender Law and its enactment of the STLA, to prohibit any two-week loan. 2012–Ohio–5566, at ¶ 12. The majority reasoned that allowing MLA registrants to make two-week, single-installment loans would “nullify the very legislation that is designed to regulate payday-type loans.” Id. at ¶ 11.
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<¶> Amici urge this court to hold that the STLA is the exclusive authority governing payday loans in Ohio and that regardless of how lenders label them, payday loans must comply with the STLA. Thus, even if the MLA generally permits single-installment, interest-bearing loans, amici for appellee maintain that payday loans-short-term, unsecured, single-installment consumer loans-cannot be made under the MLA because they are specifically and exclusively regulated under the STLA.
<¶>The STLA imposes duties upon a person licensed and “any person required to be licensed” under the act, and it prohibits licensees from engaging in any device or subterfuge to avoid the requirements of the act. R.C. (A); R.C. (J). Pursuant to R.C. (A), no person may make a short-term loan to an Ohio borrower without first obtaining an STLA license, but R.C. (A) defines “short-term loan” narrowly as a loan made pursuant to the STLA. Thus, there is no language in the STLA that requires a lender to be licensed under that act before making a payday-style loan. Had the General Assembly intended the STLA to be the sole authority for issuing payday-style loans, it could have defined “short-term loan” more broadly.
<¶>In an opinion issued shortly after the enactment of the STLA, the Ohio Attorney General recognized that the fact that R.C. defines a “short-term loan” as a loan under R.C. to shows that the licensing requirement in R.C. (A) applies only to those lenders who make loans under that act and not to all lenders of loans of short duration. 2008 Ohio Atty.Gen.Ops. No.2008–036, at *3. https://pdqtitleloans.com/title-loans-la/ In that opinion, the Attorney General was answering a question posed by the Department of Commerce regarding the ability of a person licensed under the Check–Cashing Lender Law to make loans pursuant to that law while also holding an STLA license, prior to the 2008 referendum. But the opinion is not as narrow as the question presented. By stating that a person who “has a valid license to make another type of loan” may make a loan in conformance with the requirements of that license, free from the limitations of the STLA, id. at *3, fn. 5, the Attorney General recognized the independence of the various lending acts.